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Insights into special costs orders: WA court examines compliance and 
retrospectivity 
Costs – application for a special costs order – whether failure to meet disclosure 
obligations rendered costs agreement void – whether costs agreement retrospective 
In Walter v Buckeridge [No.5] [2012] WASC 495 Le Miere J considered an application by the 
defendants for special costs orders under the applicable legislation in Western Australia. 
Aspects of the decision may be of persuasive value in dealing with similar issues under 
Queensland legislation.  
The facts 
There were two separate but related defamation proceedings. Both actions were hard 
fought, and involved numerous interlocutory disputes concerning pleadings and discovery, 
and also several appeals to the Court of Appeal. 
The plaintiffs applied to discontinue the proceedings with no order as to costs. In essence, 
the reasons related to frustration and a lack of will to continue the litigation, which had 
been running since December 2003. 
The defendants consented to the discontinuance but opposed the plaintiffs’ application in 
relation to costs. They sought orders that the plaintiffs pay the defendants’ costs. On 22 
November 2011 Le Miere J ordered in each action that the actions be discontinued and the 
plaintiffs pay the defendants’ costs of the actions: [2011] WASC 313. 
The defendants applied for special costs orders that on the assessment of their costs the 
limits in the scales of costs be removed. 
The costs agreements 
The plaintiffs submitted that there was no valid costs agreement between the defendants 
and their solicitors (Mallesons), and as a result the defendants were confined to the 
applicable scale of costs. It was argued that the defendants’ liability to their solicitors would 
not exceed the amount allowable under the relevant scales, and the costs allowable under 
the scales were not inadequate. 
Le Miere J noted is was clear from the decision in Hancock Family Memorial Foundation Ltd 
v Porteous [2000] WASC 61, and subsequent authorities which had accepted it, that it is not 
a prerequisite for the making of a special costs order that the party entitled to costs produce 
any costs agreement between them and their solicitors. The parties submitted nevertheless 
that it was necessary and desirable to determine the issues relating to the costs agreement 
in this application. As the matters were argued by the parties, Le Miere J decided that it was 
appropriate, as a matter of case management, that he determine them. 
There were submissions for the defendants that there was an oral costs agreement made in 
December 2003, and also a written costs agreement in force from 5 July 2004. At the time of 
the oral agreement the legislation regulating the remuneration of the legal practitioners and 
the making of costs agreements was the Legal Practitioners Act 1893 (the 1893 Act). The 
legislation applying to the written agreement was the Legal Practice Act 2003 (WA). 
Following examination of the relevant legislation, Le Miere J found that neither of these 
agreements constituted valid costs agreements. 
The defendants further submitted that there were costs agreements comprising: 
 a new written costs agreement entered into by letter of 29 November 2011 from 
Mallesons to the corporate defendant for the period 1 November 2011 to 30 June 
2012 
 a written costs agreement dated 8 March 2012. 
Costs agreement 29 November 2011 
The defendants submitted that a new costs agreement was entered into by letter dated 29 
November 2011 from Mallesons to the defendants, with attached appointment terms. The 
letter stated that it was an offer to enter into a costs agreement and that the offer could be 
accepted “by continuing to instruct us or by signing and returning a copy of this letter”. The 
agreement covered the period 1 November 2011 to 30 June 2012. 
Le Miere J noted that from March 2009 the legislation governing the remuneration of law 
practices and the making of costs agreements had been regulated by the Legal Profession 
Act 2008 (WA) (the 2008 Act). The requirements for the making of costs agreements are set 
out in s282. His Honour found that the letter appeared to satisfy in all respects the 
requirements of s282 and so constitute a costs agreement for the purposes of the 2008 Act. 
It was submitted for the plaintiffs, however, that the agreement was not a costs agreement 
for the purposes of the 2008 Act because the practitioners failed to comply with disclosure 
requirements. The first basis for the submission was there was a failure to disclose a 
number of matters that Ipp J referred to in Brown v Talbot & Olivier (1993) 9 WAR 70 as 
requiring disclosure in a costs agreement departing from the applicable scale. Le Miere J 
noted that decision related to the right of a client to seek an order setting aside an 
agreement if satisfied that the agreement was not fair and reasonable. There was in this 
case no application by the client to set aside the costs agreement, and His Honour found 
that it was not competent for the opposing party to apply for a costs agreement between a 
client and his or its solicitors to be set aside. 
Le Miere also rejected the plaintiffs’ submission that it was necessary for the legal 
practitioner to comply with its disclosure obligations under r16A of the Law Society of 
Western Australia Professional Conduct Rules, June 2002 revision. His Honour found that 
these rules did not have any legislative status, and were intended by the Law Society to be 
regarded as a guide to what was considered by the legal profession in Western Australia to 
be proper behaviour. 
The third basis for the plaintiffs’ submission relating to disclosure obligations was that the 
agreement was not a costs agreement for the purposes of the 2008 Act because the 
practitioners failed to comply with the disclosure requirements of s260 of that Act. It was 
not argued that any relevant exemption as provided under s263(2) applied in the 
circumstances. Mallesons did not comply with at least some of the disclosure requirements 
of s260(1). For example, the  agreement of 29 November 2011 did not provide an estimate 
of the total legal costs or a range of estimates of the total legal costs and an explanation of 
the major variables that would affect the calculation of those costs as required by 
s260(1)(c). The plaintiffs argued that this resulted in the costs agreement being void. 
Le Miere J accepted that a contract expressly or impliedly prohibited by a statute is void and 
unenforceable. His Honour stated, however, that a failure to comply with a statutory 
requirement does not necessarily render a contract void and unenforceable, and that it is 
necessary to determine as a matter of statutory construction whether the statute intends 
that result or some other consequence. 
On looking at the provisions of the 2008 Act, his Honour noted that there was no express 
provision that a failure to disclose rendered a costs agreement void, and he found that the 
Act intended that the consequences of a failure to disclose were those set out in s268. 
These included the right of the client to apply under s288 for the costs agreement to be set 
aside. They also included the power granted to the taxing officer by s268(4) to reduce the 
amount of costs on an assessment by an amount considered by the taxing officer to be 
proportionate to the seriousness of the failure to disclose. 
His Honour concluded that the intention of the Act was that the failure of a law practice to 
comply with the disclosure requirements did not of itself operate to render fees 
irrecoverable, and that the agreement of 29 November 2011 was a costs agreement for the 
purposes of the 2008 Act and was not void. 
Costs agreement 8 March 2012 
By an agreement comprising a letter from the defendants’ solicitors dated 8 March 2012 to 
the defendants, and a document titled ‘appointment terms’ (which included a schedule of 
fees and costs) the parties acknowledged a range of matters, including:  
 that the defendants had been instructing Mallesons since about 1 December 2003 in 
relation to the actions 
 that there was an agreement in place since on or about that date until 1 November 
2003 
 that to the extent that the agreement was in writing it may not satisfy the relevant 
legislation (the 1893 Act, the 2003 Act and the 2008 Act) 
 that the defendants were not obliged to enter into the written costs agreement, in 
which case their solicitors were only entitled to charge them at amounts no greater 
than those allowed by a relevant determination of the Legal Costs Committee (WA). 
The plaintiffs accepted that a lawyer may make a valid costs agreement with his or her client 
after the legal services have been performed, but argued that as a matter of construction 
terms of the agreement were prospective only, and did not cover work already done. 
Le Miere J said that the question whether the agreement operated retrospectively or only 
prospectively was one of the proper construction of the agreement, and was to be 
determined by what a reasonable person would have understood it to mean. That, 
normally, requires consideration not only of the text, but also of the surrounding 
circumstances known to the parties, and the purpose and object of the transaction: Toll 
(FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165 [40]; International Air Transport 
Association v Ansett Australia Holdings Ltd (2008) 234 CLR 151 [53]. 
His Honour noted that the letter of 8 March 2012 expressly stated that it was intended to 
have retrospective effect. Following consideration of the other contents of the letter and its 
attachments his Honour concluded that the agreement of 8 March 2012 was a costs 
agreement that applied retrospectively to work carried out by Mallesons between 1 
December 2003 and the date of the letter. The agreement also operated prospectively from 
that date. 
Special costs orders 
Le Miere J then considered whether it was appropriate to make a special costs order under 
the provisions of the relevant legislation. After an examination of a range of aspects of one 
of the proceedings, his Honour concluded that the amount of costs allowable for the action 
under the relevant legal costs determinations was inadequate because of the unusual 
difficulty, complexity and importance of the matter. Accordingly his Honour was satisfied 
that it was appropriate in the exercise of his discretion to make a special costs order for the 
whole of the action. 
In respect of the other proceeding the defendants sought a special costs order in relation to 
the defence and there was no dispute between the parties on this issue. The defendants 
also sought a special costs order in relation to the application for leave to discontinue the 
actions. This was contested by the plaintiffs. Le Miere J noted that there was no dispute on 
that application that the action should be discontinued, and that the dispute related only to 
costs. His Honour was not satisfied that application involved any unusual difficulty, 
complexity or importance, and he declined to make a special costs order in relation to that 
application. 
In relation to the appropriate form of order, his Honour ordered that the removal of the 
limits on costs fixed in the relevant determinations in respect of all items of work 
undertaken for the defendants in the first proceedings, and in relation to the defence in the 
second proceeding. 
Comment 
The costs disclosure requirements contained in s308 of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) 
(the Qld Act) are not materially different to those of s260 of the Legal Profession 2008 (WA). 
Similarly there is no express provision that a failure to disclose renders a costs agreement 
void, with the consequences of failure to disclose as set out in s316 of the Qld Act being the 
same as those in s268 of the Western Australia Act. 
This decision can be contrasted with the position in Casey v Quabba [2006] QCA 187 and 
ASIC v Atlantic 3 (Aust) Pty Ltd [2006] QCA 540 where, under the then Queensland Law 
Society Act 1952 (Qld) provisions, the failure to comply with disclosure requirements of s48 
specifically rendered the agreement void by operation of s48F. This legislative regime 
created a different statutory construction to that of the Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld). 
In relation to the issues involved in determining whether the agreement of March 2012 
operated retrospectively or only prospectively, the decision is consistent with the approach 
that has been taken in Queensland in Paroz v Clifford Gouldson Lawyers [2012] QDC 151 
[(2012) 32(9) Proctor 42)] and QCoal Pty Ltd v Cliffs Australia Coal Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 479 
[(2011) 31(3) Proctor 44]. 
All of these cases succeeded as retrospective costs agreements fundamentally because they 
involved ‘executed’ consideration and not ‘past’ consideration. The point was borne out in 
QCoal where it was argued that the costs agreement dealt with ‘past consideration’. The 
court found that as arrangements had been in place between the parties the retrospective 
costs agreement was only dealing with ‘executed consideration’. Justice Lyons referred to 
Eastwood v Kenyon (1840) 113 ER 482: 
“... it is quite clear that even on the most orthodox view of consideration if an act is 
done at a time when both parties appreciated that there would be payment in 
respect of that act and later there is a promise to pay then, as an alternative to a 
quantum meruit, there may be an action in contract based on that promise. 
“The consideration in such a case is usually referred to as executed, not past.” 
The distinction is important, and was one of the key reasons why the costs agreement in 
King v King [2012] QCA 81 [see (2012) 32(5) Proctor 44] failed. It was a retrospective costs 
agreement for past consideration. 
 
